Hegemony 2

Written for my Political Science class on International Relations, taught by (an awesome professor) Dr. Michael Broache in the Fall of 2018 at UNC Greensboro.

I think the grade I got on this was an 89. Written in response to feedback to my first paper, Hegemony 1. He had told me he did not understand my definition of hegemony, and so I attempted to define it.

Andrea B. Santolim Geller

Defining Hegemony

PSC 240-01

Dr. Michael Broache

Word Count: 1,122

In International Relations, sovereign entities establish avenues of influence often with a realist theory of self-advancement. This is engineered through hard and soft power, the former of which is more typically exercised by dominant regimes. Hard power is coercive and utilizes either the threat or employment of force, and debatably specific instances of sudden cessation of resources. Wielded in a variety of ways, soft power is most productively exercised by economic means. Examples categorized by globalization, non-state rational actors, industry/commerce, and ethics will provide correlation between a contextual hegemon’s influence and the response to it by subjects who are not directly governed by the hegemon. Hegemony is the ability of an entity, particularly efficient when non-coercive, to internationally influence societies into adopting a mindset or practicing a behavior.

Industry and commerce are the first most evident examples of hegemonic leverage that function on both hard and soft power. In the nineteenth century, Britain’s advancements in industrial innovation and labor increased demand for production, but due to their high tariffs, decreased its respective supply.¹ As a contradictory effect, meanwhile Britain’s imports and exports decreased, inter-state commerce and competition around them flourished. Particularly France and including Spain and Portugal, Britain’s rivals sought to enhance their own domestic industries. This account is an ironic example of how “proof of power lies not in resources but in the ability to change the behavior of states.”² Contrastingly to Britain’s failed commercial economics, transportation and communication technology since the end of the Cold War has boomed, facilitating international trade. The Chinese, European, and North American market activities have accelerated exponentially.³ Increase of monetary exchange promotes variety and quantity of independently funded investments. Weaponry manufacturing and trade is one of the distinct examples of hard power underlying soft power, or coercion hiding behind hegemony. Although it is a fearful reality that such economic progression could be administered for hard power as well, avoidance of investments in weapons is possible through global regulation.

Institutions like NATO can provide such regulation. During and after the Cold War, NATO conducted balance between nations and avoided further warfare.⁴ These non-state actors are mediums for establishing a “well-organized monetary order”⁵ that would alleviate bargaining range obstacles, like misinformation. On its own, NATO cannot prohibit nations from warring. As an entity with financial support from all sides, however, institutions can use transparency as a non-coercive manner of prohibiting free-riding. Non-governmental entities today are more equipped to act as hegemonic powers by creating worldwide accessibility to resources and products, through which we can shape the spread of ideologies. Over-regulation (and in turn, the depletion of free trade)⁶ would be counter-intuitive, but most advantageously addressed by a moderator that “seeks to explain patterns of international economic openness.”⁷ The hegemonic institution would accomplish bargaining through processes of neutrality. The evident succeeding question is whether states are capable of cooperation.

Independently from institutions, do states perform ethically relating to other states? In the context of international relations, ethic is simplified as the antithesis of coercion because although a hegemon may be dominant, “this assumption is correct only if it is rendered explicitly from the point of view of a particular subject category.”⁸ Consider the People’s Republic of China, for example. Territories under China’s rule such as Taiwan and Tibet may deem the PRC’s methods as coercive, but that does not brand China as a dominant figure or hegemon. One of Say No’s⁹ many political theories, Grand Harmony and Grand Peace/Equality are concepts which trust in nationalistic unity to generate natural expansion of China’s territory and influence.¹⁰ The PRC seeks to advance domestically by nurturing their version of inclusivity. As evidenced by the country’s economic prosperity, this patriotic attitude heightens China’s current imposing presence.¹¹ Should this mindset be applied in a hegemonic strategy, could our world population be congruous? This unanimity could eventually “employ trade as a means of facilitating and expanding her influence (as opposed to simply enhancing material well being);”¹² unless being materially sound is the exact factor which allows for employment of trade as a soft power. Or perhaps the polar is true: The United States has also effectively gained authority in the global sphere through active involvement outside its own borders. Post-World War II, they’ve provided oil to the Middle East during deficits as well as loans to European markets to stimulate recovery.¹³ Because foreign policy is a major resource for soft power,¹⁴ the U.S. has successfully attained a reputation for reliability in such. Reflecting on the opposing nations, each possess a certain weakness that render them unable to be deemed true hegemons. China’s blatant rejection of the title, paired with the consistent choice of restraint over avidity for enlargement of its territory, indicates that the country desires the status of power, but not its attached obligations. Mirroring this opinion, the U.S. appears willing to accept the responsibility. Regardless, it cannot hope to function as the international hegemon indefinitely, due to its limited resources as a solitary country. The alternative is clear: hegemony necessarily should not be assigned to a single state.

For a state or institution to secure and maintain a hegemonic status, the entity must be credible. Credibility is pivotal in differentiating between soft and hard power, and in turn, the efficiency of the rational actor’s policies. During his term, F. D. Roosevelt organized a department which supervised television as an attempt to minimize the transmission of inaccurate information. They specifically targeted Hollywood and proceeded to remove all instances of ineffective propaganda.¹⁵ When the Cold War ended, fewer U.S. Presidents and citizens invested money or thought into the soft power of information. This was proven to be crucial later when neither Mexico nor Turkey obliged with requests made by the U.S. during the Iraq war.¹⁶ Attempts to inflate Saddam Hussein’s capabilities to gain general support for deployment of troops also failed.¹⁷ Revelations since of these media programs have greatly diminished United States credibility. Contrarily, though, if the U.S. wasn’t considered of hegemonic rank, the extent to which they are credible would bear extra allowances for their diplomatic mistakes. Additionally, had their propaganda accomplished the desired effect from their audience, we may never have uncovered their acts of media distortion because we would continue to believe in them today.

Hegemony is an entity of authority that is most effectively influential when employing soft power. By focusing their efforts on soft power, other actors are more likely to cooperate, contribute, and overall improve as a collective rather than as separate states. A hegemon may be capable of establishing such an international environment if the soft power were to function as follows: efficient and ethical globalization; economic innovation for industry, commerce, transportation, and communication; and employment of neutral moderators such as institutions for solving collective goods bargains.

Footnotes

1. Nye (1991), page 224.
2. Nye (1990), page 155.
3. See Nye (1990), page 161; and Forges (2001) no particular page. Nye describes various ways in which global economics have expanded rapidly, and does not himself mention China. However, in combination with Forges’ article, it is evident China has seen the effect of this expansion.
4. Keohane (1995), page 42.
5. Kindleberger (1978), page 156. Professor Cohen’s conditions for organized world finances.
6. Kindleberger (1978), page 156. A mention of how nations will prioritize their individual interests over the functionality of the entire system: “...influential countries will not conform to an international monetary system, of whatever type, if it conflicts with their national interests or appears to deprive them of prestige.”
7. Lake (1993), page 460. This read most likely inspired in me the idea of differentiating hegemony from dominance/coercion, because he also polarizes the term into “leadership theory” and “hegemony theory.”
8. Kurtz (1996), page 106. This is the read that led me to Gramsci.
9. Forges, Rogers Des, and Luo Xu (2001), entire article is about the “China Can Say No” authors. Essentially, they are authors that delineate how the Chinese population still believes in its country (patriotism) and rejects Western influence more than our/the media really exhibits.
10. Forges (2001), page 493. In-depth descriptions of Grand Harmony and Grand Peace/Equality.
11. Forges (2001), page 486. About China’s greatness.
12. Nye (1991), page 213.
13. Ikenberry (1989), page 380-381.
14. Nye (2008), page 96. “The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).”
15. Nye (2008), page 98.
16. Nye (2008), page 99.
17. Nye (2008), page 100.

Works Cited

Forges, Roger Des, and Luo Xu. "China as a non-hegemonic superpower? The uses of history among the China Can Say No writers and their critics." Critical Asian Studies 33.4 (2001): 483-507.

Keohane, Robert O., and Lisa L. Martin. "The promise of institutionalist theory." International security 20.1 (1995): 39-51.

Kindleberger, Charles Poor. Economic response: comparative studies in trade, finance, and growth. Harvard University Press, 1978.

Kurtz, Donald V. "Hegemony and anthropology: Gramsci, exegeses, reinterpretations." Critique of Anthropology 16.2 (1996): 103-135.

Lake, David A. "Leadership, hegemony, and the international economy: Naked emperor or tattered monarch with potential?." International Studies Quarterly 37.4 (1993): 459-489.

Nye Jr, Joseph S. "Public diplomacy and soft power." The annals of the American academy of political and social science 616.1 (2008): 94-109.

Nye, John Vincent. "Revisionist tariff history and the theory of hegemonic stability." Politics & Society 19.2 (1991): 209-232.

Nye, Joseph S. "Soft power." Foreign policy 80 (1990): 153-171.