Hegemony 1

Written for my Political Science class on International Relations, taught by (an awesome professor) Dr. Michael Broache in the Fall of 2018 at UNC Greensboro.

I believe the grade I got on this was a 93, points taken off mainly because he did not fully comprehend what was my definition of 'hegemony.' So I wrote a second paper, attempting to define it. See: Hegemony 2

Andrea B. Santolim Geller

The Accuracy and Necessity of Hegemony

PSC 240-01

Dr. Michael Broache

Paper Word Count: 1,222

When discussing idyllic circumstances for promoting and practicing cooperative methods between international entities, within and without formal institutions, we inevitably face the ultimate repeating obstacle: anarchy. As is commonly understood in modern-day discussion of political theory, anarchy is less so defined by inherent chaos or otherwise constant opposition between parties of influence and is more so defined by a lack of a central unifying sovereignty. The chaos ideology is based on the feared assumption that the “other” is undoubtedly seeking power that is comparably greater to all involved and is therefore lacking consideration of “my” interests. Such a mindset is considered realist theory in the political sciences, and in the context of current events’, is one that is detrimental to improving and advancing the interactions of human beings. In this anarchic international system, a hegemony that is capable of delegating rules for a framework as well as providing the tools for establishing such, and simultaneously attending to all individual and mutual interests is indeed a perfect world.

By adopting a hegemonic structure in a system, one entity is given both all-around power and responsibility. There is less credibility for accomplishing cooperation in bipolar and multipolar systems because cooperation must occur between powerful separate actors, versus within a single, powerful, united one. As defined by Keohane, cooperation occurs when “each party changes his or her behavior contingent on changes in the other's behavior.”¹ When a single sovereign is authorized to enforce changes of behavior from each party, cooperation becomes a result of an efficient, structured process.

Hegemonic positions of current powers have exemplified successful results. Ikenberry delineates how the United States utilized their superior global influence in providing collective goods such as oil, enforcing cooperative methods such as establishing policies post-war, and generally having the capability to provide aid during violent events.² Although not all institutions are the hegemonies of their time, they do indeed exert power and make decisions that are of a hegemonic nature. Keohane and Martin discuss how NATO, the EU, and the ECJ have maintained and continue to maintain peace relations between countries through bargaining conflicts.³ They discuss how such institutions “provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity”⁴ particularly because states are willing to invest in them.⁵ Various nations’ willingness to invest in these institutions reflect their fundamental intentions to cooperate with one another. By determining an entity, a “rational actor” per se, to which they will individually provide for and in turn collectively adhere to, states are more liable to make decisions that fit within a bargaining range.

Due to the expansion of global communication, established norms are necessary to avoiding bargaining failure. The occurrence of this is caused primarily by conflict of interests, be it intentional or no. Keohane and Axelrod discuss the issues that manifest due to, and continue to emphasize, anarchy. In the beginning of this discussion, they assert that “experimental evidence demonstrated that the greater the conflict of interest between the players [or actors], the greater the likelihood that the players would in fact choose to defect.”⁶ However, they also determine that the perception of interests, and therefore their conflicts, are oftentimes distorted to what degree they are mutual, or are not.⁷ Meaning, the choice to defect may not be well-founded, if greater clarity between parties were enforced. In a bargaining situation, “the more optimistic a player's assessment of his opponent's stake in the negotiation, the more aggressive it can afford to be when bargaining.”⁸ What if such clarity were not only optimistic, but a reality?

Evidently, incomplete information is but one of many factors that contribute to warring, or in other words, bargaining failure. Fearon reminds us that “after a few years of war, fighters on both sides of an insurgency typically develop accurate understandings of the other side’s capabilities, tactics, and resolve.”⁹ Nonetheless, states often choose to continue fighting. This indicates that even within a hegemonic system which coerces actors to reveal all relevant information, war continues to be a possibility. Powell would argue that this is due to a commitment problem. In a bargaining situation, a state may not possess the resources necessary to uphold their end of the bargain. The other state(s), even if they can meet the expectations placed upon them, acknowledge the possibility of this commitment problem for the other state(s), and so all actors involved consider war the alternative to eliminate the bargaining range altogether.¹⁰

A hegemony that proves these resources and defines to all actors that it can and will do so, removes such insecurity. Particularly significant to these cooperative mechanisms is the very real potentiality of an integrated international market. After all, if “goods” are the underlying sources of dispute among states, an organized hegemonic economic system appears promising. Cabrera describes how “states likely would not remain the most significant economic units, replaced instead by myriad regional units coordinated and regulated by genuinely empowered global economic institutions, though not tightly integrated politically at the global level.”¹¹ Perhaps it is not a political hegemony we need, but an economic one. Unfortunately, this plainly leads to the subsequent uncertainty: indivisible goods.

Value of certain goods is lost when it is divided, and states, individually and collectively, are not willing to sacrifice that value. In fact, this appears to be the strongest argument against hegemony, because unless the hegemony has the power to maintain the value of a divided good as equal to if it were not divided, “indivisible goods” will always be a point of contention, and possible war. Value is attributed to these goods, they do not exist separately from human judgment. On defining value, Simmel argues that “we call those objects valuable that resist our desire to possess them.”¹² Because this is a political science paper and not one on philosophy, I will go no further to discuss the meaning of value. However, it is important to note that value can be determined, and redetermined, in theory by a global hegemony. Acknowledging this allows for the restructuring of how a “good” is or isn’t “indivisible.” By doing so, the divisibility of goods including but not limited to territory, military, food, water, lumber, oil, or even money is less so a concern. A hegemony would still require caution when choosing to re-value a divided good, however, because doing so can ultimately cause a decrease of activity in the market for that good.

Should the metaphorical or literal popular vote, in the present or future, decide on a hegemony, a full century of preparation would likely need to take place. The current state of international affairs has only become more intricate and less coordinated with each rising debate and falling accessibility to constructive tools. It appears that the “emergence of a world state [hegemony], meaning an entity exercising a global monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive power is, in fact, inevitable,”¹³ and as such it is crucial that it be assembled equally by all peoples of our planet earth. A global hegemony appears to be the only logical response to the growing tensions between powers today. Steps toward unity, rather than division, is the only political avenue that will ultimately secure our species’ evolution regarding peace.

Works Cited

Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. "Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions." World politics 38.1 (1985): 226-254.

Cabrera, Luis. "World government: Renewed debate, persistent challenges." European Journal of International Relations 16.3 (2010): 511-530.

Chatterjee, Kalyan, and William Samuelson. "Bargaining under incomplete information." Operations research 31.5 (1983): 835-851.

Fearon, James D. "Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?." Journal of Peace Research 41.3 (2004): 275-301.

Ikenberry, G. John. "Rethinking the origins of American hegemony." Political Science Quarterly 104.3 (1989): 375-400.

Keohane, Robert O. "International institutions: Two approaches." International studies quarterly 32.4 (1988): 379-396.

Keohane, Robert O., and Lisa L. Martin. "The promise of institutionalist theory." International security 20.1 (1995): 39-51.

Powell, Robert. "War as a commitment problem." International organization 60.1 (2006): 169-203.

Simmel, Georg. The philosophy of money. Routledge, 2004.